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The United States' Second Major Theatre of War: A Bridge Too Far?
Introduction
The United States National Security Strategy (NSS), as set forth by President
William Jefferson Clinton in 1998, articulated the "Imperative for Engagement" abroad in order to remain secure at home in the aftermath of the "Cold War." Accordingly, in an era marked by globalization, transnational interests and threats, and ethnic and regional strife, ". . . the United States must be prepared to use all instruments of National Power, alone or in concert with allies and partners, to influence the actions of both state and nonstate actors." It further states, " . . .we must have the demonstrated will and capabilities to continue to exert global leadership and remain the security partner for the community of states that share our interests." 1 Implicit in our NSS is a commitment by the United
States Government (USG) to dedicate the resources necessary to successfully execute this global engagement strategy. To that end, this paper will explore the National Military Strategy (NMS) intended to support an NSS of "Engagement," its three elements ("Shape, Respond, Prepare Now"), and the "Core Military Requirement" of being able to "deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies." At the same time, the CINCs are attempting to meet the other four tasks inherent in the NMS --promote regional stability through cooperative actions and alliances, prevent conflict and reduce threats through arms control measures and, most importantly, deter aggression through conventional military capability, forward presence, force projection capability, and military coalition building. The result of all this global "engagement" and "shaping" is an over-committed and under-resourced military ever more vulnerable to a serious challenge to its core military requirement --being able to deter and if necessary fight and win two majors theater wars during overlapping timeframes.
Major theatre wars, though most challenging, are in fact least likely to occur.
However, many other challenges to our interests cause the USG to respond with military force or forces ---the second element of our NMS.
What Must We Be Able To Do?
The second element of our national security strategy calls for the United States to respond to the full spectrum of security crises threatening our national interests throughout the world. The burden of being the dominant global power means being prepared to use that power when called upon to support allies, deter or defeat foes or join coalitions with similar security interests. History has demonstrated the USG lead in shaping the international environment will often fall short of our aims or be upset by "Wild Cards" or the miscalculations of aggressor states. Accordingly, our NMS requires our military forces be capable of responding from any position of global engagement to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames, preferably with in concert with regional allies.
5
In addition to this daunting military challenge, our forces must retain a credible capability to deter other potential aggressors or actors tempted to seize this opportunity to coerce neighboring states or indigenous people seeking international protection. All the while this core capability must be maintained by the military while concurrently responding to multiple smaller-scale contingencies (SSC).
These SSC operations encompass the full range of joint military operations beyond peacetime engagement activities, but short of major theatre warfare and include:
show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, peace enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counter-terrorism operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. The third element of our NMS strategy is to prepare now for an uncertain future.
There are several facets to this strategy --and each one is costly. First, is the implicit requirement to spend sufficient monies to recapitalize the equipment and infrastructure used by the military. Unfortunately, this has not been feasible in the recent political environment. In fact, the DOD Budget Authority in FY2001 constant dollars is actually declining in real terms over the FYDP, from 292 billion to 288 billion. 7 And, the portion of the Services budget used for recapitalization --the Operations and Maintenance
Accounts ---has frequently been used to fund shortfalls in paying for numerous SSCs and other military engagement operations. Also, the number and duration of these operations has exceeded the projected usage data for many major weapons systems. This is particularly true in numerous programs such as the F-15, F-16, C-5, and C-17.
The willingness or desire to employ the military component of our national Finally, the USG is committed to exploiting the "Revolution in Business Affairs" as it seeks more efficiency and effectiveness in the most wasteful of endeavors --preparing for, deterring, and waging war! Clearly, this will require investment in capital goods, personnel training, and contractor assistance --sunk costs the USG and the DOD must pay up front in the hopes of achieving future savings. All of these modernization initiatives are more costly then ever as the high technology dependent US military seeks to maintain and advance its technological advantage. These opportunity costs are eating up precious funds, and that adversely affects the military's ability to fulfill its core military task --to fight and win in two nearly simultaneous major regional wars. And when those crises occur, rapidly moving forces requires (primarily) strategic airlift. However, the Air Force's capability to move forces rapidly between theatres has been reduced by about 22 percent.
Requirement
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(One other issue worth noting is the impact of Presidential Support on AMC assets when the President is traveling abroad. A significant part of our strategic lift assets are often dedicated to meeting this "Priority 1A" tasking.
Should a crisis develop when the President is abroad, there would be further delays in moving flexible deterrent options.) Clearly, the ability to deploy heavy formations to Southwest Asia and the Korean Peninsula in overlapping time frames without stripping EUCOM/NATO is a stretch. Additionally, the Army's National Guard enhancedreadiness brigade training level is suspect in many senior officers' minds --an important part of the reason they were not sent to Operation DESERT STORM.
The third issue is one that has been discussed for years --the problem of high-demand low-density assets and units. The US operations in Kosovo placed unprecedented demands on numerous high-demand low-density assets and highlighted the shortfall in electronic counter-measures, airborne tankers, Rivet Joint and Joint-Stars aircraft.
Additionally, strategic airlift was again taxed to support ongoing operations such as Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, rapidly moving ground and air units to Kosovo. The example of Task Force HAWK is a painful reminder of the demands on Air Mobility
Command during both the build-up and sustainment phases of an MTW.
Perhaps the greatest example of requirement and capability mismatch is that of deliberate NBC decontamination. The NMS states, " . . . the Joint Force must be able to defeat adversaries in two distant, overlapping major theater wars from a posture of global engagement and in the face of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other asymmetrical threats." 11 However, this capability is not resident in sufficient numbers in the any of the services' active components, and barely adequate in the Reserves. This mismatch is a critical vulnerability in our military capability and directly impacts on our ability to execute a two MTW response. Potential adversaries might well be tempted to exploit this shortfall and not be deterred by the use of flexible deterrent options employed during times of crisis. How might an aggressor do this?
Risk
Operational Plans and Wishful Thinking
The US plan for winning a second major theatre war in close proximity to another conflict is approaching an unacceptable level of risk. The second major capability shortfall is the lack of deliberate NBC decontamination capability in both our active and reserve forces. The NMS specifically highlights the need to fight in this environment, yet the Services have not fielded the necessary capability. This lack of decontamination capability makes US forces extremely vulnerable to asymmetric attacks, severely degrades our combat efficiency, adds burdens to strategic airlift and medical evacuation assets, makes force reconstitution a much longer process, and directly impacts on Civil Reserve Air Fleet assets and commercial shipping. If not one, but both, theatres involve chemical or biological contamination, the likelihood of succeeding in the second MTW is remote.
Conclusion
The United States' ability to successfully meet its core military requirement of "deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames, preferably with regional allies" is at risk.
The national security strategy and national military strategy have over-tasked our military element of power in an era of declining force structure and funding. This reduced capability along with the growing interoperability gap of our allies makes us increasingly vulnerable to asymmetric threats and ultimately subject to military and political defeat in a second major theatre war scenario.
Now is the time to review our engagement strategy before our adversaries are able to exploit our mismatched ends, ways and means. If we fail to do so, the United
States risks not only its prestige and leadership mantle, but its sons and daughters, as well.
